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Introduction
In 2009, Andrew Simester’s article ‘Intoxication is Never a Defence’ effectively highlighteda point he described as ‘a simple one, and not entirely new’; that despite the longstanding
(and enduring) description of  the intoxication rules as a defence, this is not (and never has
been) accurate.1 The classification of  intoxication as a defence is one of  the criminal law’s
more peculiar self-delusions, not least because of  the generally uncontroversial reasons for
reaching the opposite conclusion. This is not a point of  pedantry. As Simester explains, the
appropriate classification of  the intoxication rules as inculpatory leads us to evaluate those
rules through a different set of  norms and (as a logical conclusion) to question whether the
law would be better served by a new voluntary intoxication-based offence.2
Following a similar pattern (albeit one that is likely, due to its relative novelty, to face
greater resistance), it is our contention that the ‘defence’ of  automatism is also incorrectly
categorised.3 A claim of  automatism is a claim that D is not responsible for an (otherwise)
criminal event because her acts were not voluntary. Therefore, automatism is never a
defence; it is a description of  an event that does not amount to an offence. Or, as we will
see (in circumstances of  prior fault), it provides a method of  inculpation. Having explored
and justified this interpretation, the article will discuss what this means for the development
of  the law when addressing longstanding debates surrounding automatism, such as the
* The authors thank Dr Tanya Palmer for comments on an earlier draft.
1 Andrew P Simester, ‘Intoxication is Never a Defence’ [2009] Criminal Law Review 3.
2 Ibid 14. A similar conclusion, based on similar reasoning, is reached by ??INITIALS?? Smith and Williams in
the Criminal Law Revision Committee, Offences Against the Person (1980) 113–14. See also Rebecca Williams,
‘Voluntary Intoxication—a Lost Cause?’ (2013) 129 Law Quarterly Review 264; and John Child, ‘Prior Fault:
Blocking Defences or Constructing Crimes’ in Alan Reed and Michael Bohlander (eds), General Defences:
Domestic and Comparative Perspectives (Ashgate 2014).
3 See Law Commission, Criminal Liability: Insanity and Automatism Discussion Paper (July 2013) para 1.27: ‘If  a
person totally lacked control of  his or her body at the time of  the offence, and that lack of  control was not
caused by his or her own prior fault, then he or she may plead not guilty and may be acquitted. This is referred
to as the defence of  automatism. It is a common law defence and it is available for all crimes.’; and see William
Wilson, Irshaad Ibrahim, Peter Fenwick and Richard Marks, ‘Violence, Sleepwalking and the Criminal Law (2)
The Legal Aspects’ [2005] Criminal Law Review 614, 618: ‘[A]utomatism floats relatively unchecked in the
space between denials of  capacity, denials of  free choice and denials of  bad character.’ For a wider discussion
of  prior fault and the categorisation of  offences and defences see Child (n 2).
necessary degree of  involuntariness, as well as issues that emerge as a direct result, such as
questions of  fair labelling. As with the parallel analysis of  intoxication, the logical
conclusion of  this debate is also the discussion of  the potential for a new (prior) fault-based
automatism offence.
Presentation of automatism in the current law
As with the intoxication rules, automatism is almost universally presented and discussed as
a defence: defeating liability with the claim that D’s acts were involuntary. This is reflected
in the presentation of  automatism in textbooks, where the concept is often touched upon
during early chapters on actus reus and mens rea, but then quickly referred to in a later and
fuller discussion as a general defence. It is also an interpretation that appears consistently
within the appellate courts, with the ‘defence’ only defeated by evidence of  prior fault. In
Quick,4 Lawton LJ quotes with approval that:
Automatism is a defence to a charge . . . provided that a person takes reasonable
steps to prevent himself  from acting involuntarily in a manner dangerous to the
public. It must be caused by some factor which he could not reasonably foresee
and not by a self-induced incapacity.
Similarly, Lord Justice Hughes has recently stated in C5 that:
. . . the defence of  automatism is not available to a defendant who has induced
an acute state of  involuntary behaviour by his own fault.
As with similar statements relating to intoxication, these passages are not substantively
wrong. They are misleading because they present the role of  automatism in reverse: they
present automatism as a defence capable of  exculpating D from liability unless it is defeated
by evidence of  D culpably creating the conditions of  her own defence.
The significance of  automatism, as presently constructed, is to facilitate the individual
actor with a means for raising a doubt as to whether she acted with the requisite culpability
for the offence, and behaved voluntarily.6 The common law, in broad terms, has made three
classificatory distinctions related to perceived automatistic exculpation. First, the
substantive law has demarcated automatism deriving from a disease of  the mind (internal
cause), and transmogrified such cases under insanity and mental defect provisions: mind
referring herein to the ‘ordinary sense of  the mental faculties of  reason, memory and
understanding’.7 A wide range of  disposal powers has attached to the special verdict in this
regard, viewed as essential for societal protection8 and as a deterrent against recurrence of
Northern Ireland Legal Quarterly 65(2)168
4 [1973] QB 910. 
5 [2013] EWCA Crim 223 [24].
6 See T H Jones, ‘Insanity, Automatism and the Burden of  Proof  on the Accused’ (1995) 111 Law Quarterly
Review 475; and see generally, Stephen J Morse, ‘Culpability and Control’ (1994) 142 University of
Pennsylvania Law Review 1587; William Wilson, ‘Impaired Voluntariness: The Variable Standards’ (2003) 6
Buffalo Law Review 1011; and R D Mackay and B J Mitchell, ‘Sleepwalking, Automatism and Insanity’ [2006]
Criminal Law Review 901.
7 Kemp [1957] 1 QB 399, 407 (Devlin J): and see Patrick Healy, ‘Automatism Confined’ (2000) 45 McGill Law
Journal 87 [22]: ‘The crux of  the approach is based on a double fiction: that automatistic involuntariness is
presumptively internal in its origin, and that anything in the nature of  an internal mental cause of  automatism
is presumptively mental disorder.’
8 Sullivan [1984] AC 156, 172 (Lord Diplock): ‘The purpose of  the legislation relating to the defence of  insanity,
ever since its origin in 1800, has been to protect society against recurrence of  the dangerous conduct.’
violence.9 Second, extant law has deontologically adduced involuntariness causally related to
externally verifiable conditions, ‘some external factor such as violence, drugs, including
anaesthetics, alcohol and hypnotic influences’.10 The prevalence of  external factors,
evidentially raised by the defendant and supported by medical evidence as to effect, may
allow an absolute acquittal.
The binary divide created between internal/external causes has been problematic, and
at times capricious,11 in that it fails to make an appropriate classificatory division between
physical and mental disorders, and both factorisations may operate simultaneously, for
example, in relation to sleepwalking or hypnosis.12 The defendant may be stereotyped in a
particular taxonomy, despite acting in a similar involuntary manner, notably as diabetes is
viewed as an internal factor whilst the administration of  insulin is external.13 Problems have
also arisen over the correct ascription of  disparate types of  dissociative states.14
The classificatory system adopted has been vituperatively criticised as ‘illogical’,15 ‘little
short of  a disgrace’16 and as ‘making no sense’,17 and on occasions a judicial divining-rod
has been needed for cause identification. A third ingredient is added to the mix in that
culpability (prior fault) may operate to constitutively superimpose responsibility and deny
exculpation, particularly evident in terms of  driving offences and the intoxicated defendant.
For example, in C,18 a driving case, Moses LJ set out the orthodox view that D would ‘have
to provide an evidential basis for asserting that he could not reasonably have avoided the
hypoglycaemic attack by advance testing’.19 Prior fault principles, as stated, have been
developed at common law for inculcated policy derivations to regulate the automatistic
intoxicated ‘offender’.
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9 Parks [1992] SCR 871, 901 (La Forest J) in the Supreme Court of  Canada: ‘The continuing danger theory holds
that any condition likely to present a recurring danger to the public should be treated as insanity . . . The two
theories share a common concern for recurrence, the latter holding that an internal weakness is more likely to
lead to recurrent violence than automatism brought on by some intervening external cause.’
10 Quick [1973] QB 910.
11 See C [2013] EWCA Crim 223 [20] (Hughes LJ): ‘It is well known that the distinction drawn in Quick between
external factors inducing a condition of  the mind and internal factors which can properly be described as a
disease can give rise to apparently strange results at the margin.’
12 Wilson et al (n 3) 617: ‘The line drawn between sane and insane automatism can never make medical sense’:
It makes illogical, hair-splitting distinctions inevitable, allowing some ‘an outright acquittal while condemning
others to plead guilty or take the risk of  a special verdict’.
13 See Andrew Ashworth and Jeremy Horder, Principles of  Criminal Law 7th edn (Oxford University Press 2013)
94: ‘There can be no sense in classifying hypoglycaemic states as automatism and hyperglycaemic states as
insanity, when both states are so closely associated with a common condition as diabetes.’
14 See K Campbell, ‘Psychological Blow Automatism: A Narrow Defence’ (1980) 23 Criminal Law Quarterly
342; and B J Kormos, ‘The Post-Traumatic Stress Defence in Canada: Reconnoitring the Old Lie’ (2008) 54
Criminal Law Quarterly 189.
15 Law Commission (n 3) para 1.46 (Lord Justice Davis), referring to para 1.31 of  the Supplementary Material to the
Scoping Paper.
16 Ibid. See Ronnie Mackay and Markus Reuber, ‘Epilepsy and the Defence of  Insanity—Time for Change’
[2007] Criminal Law Review 782, 791 stating this has led to the creation of  ‘a complex body of  law which is
manifestly unsatisfactory’.
17 Ashworth and Horder (n 13).
18 [2007] EWCA Crim 1862.
19 Ibid [35] and [38].
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A similar presentation is also reflected explicitly in most common law jurisdictions.20 The
Supreme Court in Canada, for example, has consistently viewed automatism as a ‘defence’.21
In Parks22 and Stone,23 fundamental review of  the parameters of  this defence concluded that
it is predicated on involuntariness constituting a complete lack of  capacity to control one’s
conduct: unconsciousness, whether total or impaired is not supererogatory. Moreover, in
Stone this defence has been deconstructed in reductionist terms: automatism is couched in a
blanket of  suspicion.24 Trial judges, in light of  the Stone decision, must weigh the adequacy
of  D’s case to a balance of  probabilities standardisation before the issue will even be put to
normative fact-finders.25 Policy-driven inculcations prevail in that it is believed that
paternalistic considerations demand that it is necessary to protect the public from feigned
claims of  automatism. The judiciary should provide a bulwark against juries as moral arbiters
who might be ‘too quick to accept the story of  an accused’.26 Canadian courts have
advocated a ‘holistic’ approach to dilemmatic choices presented and the adoption of  a twin
factorisation that embraces an internal cause test and the continuing danger test.27 The
former test invokes, as in English law, a bifurcation between internal and external causes of
automatism, and in reality a dichotomous determination in cases where facts and
circumstances typically reflect shades of  grey, as in diabetes, sleepwalking and dissociative
states. The latter test, as presaged by Lord Denning in Bratty,28 determines that any condition
of  the defendant which is likely to recur and thereby present a danger to the public should
be treated as a disease of  the mind and subject to a wide range of  disposal powers.
The presentation of  automatism as a defence can also be seen, most recently, in the
work of  the Law Commission of  England and Wales.29 The recent Law Commission
proposals, if  adopted, would abrogate the schism that currently applies between internal
and external causes of  involuntary behaviour. A much broader template is suggested,
creating a ‘defence’ predicated on a lack of  capacity (total) arising from a recognised medical
condition (RMC) embracing individuals with mental disorders and physical conditions, such
as a person who suffers an epileptic seizure or who has a sleepwalking episode, or through
a neurological defect such as Huntington’s disease, but specifically excluding acute
intoxication and where the condition was manifested solely or principally by abnormally
aggressive or seriously irresponsible conduct.30 The party seeking to raise the RMC defence
must adduce evidence from at least two experts that at the time of  the alleged offence they
wholly lacked capacity: (i) rationally to form a judgment about the relevant conduct or
circumstances; (ii) to understand the wrongfulness of  what he or she is charged with having
done; or (iii) to control his or her physical acts in relation to the relevant conduct or
circumstances.31
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20 See, for example, Scotland (Ross v HM Advocate (1991) JC 210); New Zealand (Bannin (1991) 2 NZLR 237);
and Draft Criminal Code for England and Wales (1989) cl 33.
21 See Holly Phoenix, ‘Automatism: A Fading Defence’ (2010) 56 Criminal Law Quarterly 328; and Stanley Yeo,
‘Clarifying Automatism’ (2002) 25 International Journal of  Law and Psychiatry 445.
22 [1992] 2 SCR 871, 75 CCC (3d) 287, 15 CR (4th) 289.
23 [1999] SCJ No 27, 134 CCC (3d) 353, 24 CR (5th) 1.
24 Ibid [180] (Bastarache J).
25 Ibid.
26 Ibid [29].
27 Phoenix (n 21) 352; and see Yeo (n 21) 449: ‘Defendants pleading automatism are claiming that they are not
criminally responsible for their conduct because they lacked the capacity to control such conduct.’
28 [1963] AC 386, 409.
29 Law Commission (n 3) 
30 Ibid para 4.158–63.
31 Ibid para 4.160.
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The broader gateway proposals for the new RMC defence are aligned with a more
delimited role for automatism per se. The ‘defence’ of  automatism would be available only
where there is a total loss of  capacity to control one’s actions which is not caused by a
recognised medical condition and for which the defendant was not culpably responsible.32
An accused who successfully pleaded automatism would be simply acquitted. The Law
Commission schema, consequently, restricts automatistic behaviour to automatic reflex
reactions, or to transient states or circumstances, and only if  an individual’s condition
persists and worsens it might then qualify as an RMC.33 The difficulty, of  course, as
presented herein is the underlying premise of  defence nomenclature, and the counterfactual
assumption created thereby.
It is our view that this presentation of  automatism does not conform to conventions
relating to the division offences and defences; conventions (ironically) that have been
consistently authorised by these same legal bodies.
Not a defence, even exceptionally
Offence elements are designed to target criminal wrongs; defining external (actus reus) and
internal (mens rea) requirements in order to specify and isolate proscribed events. In contrast,
criminal defences, strictly conceived, work in the opposite direction; defining certain
circumstances where, despite committing the criminal offence, D’s conduct should
nevertheless be excused from liability.34 For example, D may commit the offence of  theft
(satisfying both actus reus and mens rea elements) and yet be acquitted on the basis of  a
successful defence of  duress: D is inculpated by her satisfaction of  the offence elements,
but then exculpated again by the defence. The distinction is a simple one, but it is also vitally
important in order to make sense of  the law in both substantive and moral terms.35
At the core of  every criminal offence (including so-called strict or absolute liability
offences) is the requirement that D’s acts or omissions were performed voluntarily.36
Criminal offences are generally constructed from a variety of  external circumstances and
results, but it is D’s voluntary role within these elements that acts as a nexus of  agency to
hold them together: they become a single criminal event for which D may be held
responsible. Thus, if  D’s conduct is involuntary (for example, D is unconscious or is being
physically manipulated by X) then there is no nexus and D cannot have committed an
offence. Automatism, as a denial of  voluntary conduct, is therefore not a defence, it is a
denial of  this nexus and thus a denial of  the offence itself. As Fletcher explains:
Excuses arise in cases in which the actor’s freedom of  choice is constricted. His
conduct is not strictly involuntary as if  he suffered a seizure or if  someone
pushed his knife-holding hand down on the victim’s throat. In these cases there
is no act at all, no wrongdoing and therefore no need for an excuse.37
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32 Law Commission (n 3) para 3.18; and see Andrew Ashworth, ‘Insanity and Automatism: A Discussion Paper’
[2013] Criminal Law Review 787.
33 Law Commission (n 3) para 5.110.
34 In the context of  partial defences, their role is to block liability for murder (leading to liability for voluntary
manslaughter instead).
35 For a discussion of  this, see John Gardner, ‘Fletcher on Offences and Defences’, in Offences and Defences: Selected
Essays in the Philosophy of  Criminal Law (Oxford University Press 2007) 141, 144–46; Susan Dimock, ‘Actio
Libera in Causa’ (2013) 7 Criminal Law and Philosophy 549, 554; and William Wilson, ‘The Structure of
Criminal Defences’ [2005] Criminal Law Review 108.
36 Ingrid Patient, ‘Some Remarks about the Element of  Voluntariness in Offences of  Strict Liability’ [1968]
Criminal Law Review 23. The very rare exceptions to this rule have met with heavy criticism. See, for example,
Larsonneur (1933) 24 Cr App R 74. 
37 George Fletcher, Rethinking Criminal Law (Little Brown 2000) para. 10.3.2.
A similar point is made by Lord Denning in Bratty, although he goes on in this case to
discuss automatism as a defence:
No act is punishable if  it is done involuntarily: and an involuntary act in this
context—some people nowadays prefer to speak of  it as ‘automatism’—means
an act which is done by the muscles without any control by the mind, such as a
spasm, a reflex action or a convulsion. . . . 38
Of  course, talking loosely, even outside of  automatism, it is possible to describe the denial
of  an offence in terms of  a defence: this is common among barristers and particularly in
civil law. Such descriptions are not consistent with the label ‘defence’ within the substantive
law. For example, where D is brought to court on charges relating to burglary, she may claim
that she was out of  the country when the crime took place and therefore could not have
been responsible. This is not a defence, it is an alibi, it is a denial that she completed the
elements of  the offence. The same is true with automatism.
It is worth noting here that there is some disagreement about which offence elements
are denied when D claims to be acting in an automatic state. In Scotland, for example,
involuntary conduct is described as a denial of  mens rea: D may have acted in the sense of
moving her body, but the movement was not internally willed.39 This is also our preferred
method of  analysis.40 Williams, in this regard, has identified that the capacity to act
otherwise is constitutively the essence of  voluntariness:41 automatism is reviewed through
a legal prism whereby it is an ‘unnecessary refinement’42 to view the doctrine as going
beyond the denial of  mens rea. Moreover, conduct is voluntary for the purposes of  criminal
responsibility, ‘when the person could not have refrained from it if  he had so willed; that is,
he could have acted otherwise or kept still’;43 metaphorically, we should ask if  D could have
acted in a different fashion, if  there had been ‘a policeman at his shoulder’.44 English
courts45 (and the Law Commission of  England and Wales)46 have generally described
automatism as a denial of  the actus reus: involuntary action not being considered as action at
all. It may be that this uncertainty has encouraged use of  the non-element specific
terminology of  automatism and perhaps thereby contributed to its presentation as a form
of  defence. However, this is mere speculation. What is important is that, whichever side of
this debate one prefers, there remains the concession that the central role of  automatism is
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38 Bratty [1963] AC 386, 409.
39 Ross v HM Advocate (1991) JC 201, 213; and see, Pamela R Ferguson, ‘The Limits of  the Automatism Defence’
(1991) 36 Journal of  the Law Society of  Scotland 446; Iain MacDougall, ‘Automatism—Negation of  Mens Rea’
(1992) 37 Journal of  the Law Society of  Scotland 57; Pamela R Ferguson, ‘Automatism—A Rejoinder’ (1992)
37 Journal of  the Law Society of  Scotland 58; and Claire McDiarmid, ‘How Do They Do That? Automatism,
Coercion, Necessity and Mens Rea in Scots Criminal Law’ in Reed and Bohlander (n 2).
40 As little turns on this debate for the current article, it will not be pursued in detail.
41 Glanville Williams, Textbook of  Criminal Law 2nd edn (Stevens & Sons 1983) 148.
42 Ibid 663.
43 Ibid 148.
44 Ibid.
45 Bratty [1963] AC 386.
46 Law Commission (n 3) para 5.8. Some commentators have viewed automatism as a denial of  either actus reus
or mens rea simultaneously: see Emily Grant, ‘While You Were Sleeping or Addicted: A Suggested Expansion
of  the Automatism Doctrine to Include an Addiction Defense’ (2000) University of  Illinois Law Review 997,
1002–03: ‘Theoretically, the defense may be viewed from either standpoint, and thus it may be considered as
relieving criminal liability either because the defendant lacks the mental state required for approval of  a crime,
or because the defendant has not engaged in an act—that is, involuntary bodily movement.’; and see Paul H
Robinson, ‘A Functional Analysis of  Mens Rea’ (1994) 88 Northwestern University Law Review 857, 896:
‘Voluntariness might be thought to be more akin to mens rea than to actus reus elements.’
to deny something essential within the offence. Where all offence elements are satisfied,
where we naturally move to consider defences, automatism has no role.47
In the US, the standpoint, in both the Model Penal Code (MPC) and across respective
jurisdictions, has been that the demand that an act or omission be voluntary can be viewed
as a preliminary requirement of  culpability:48 ‘[a] person is not guilty of  an offense unless
his liability is based on conduct which includes a voluntary act or the omission to perform
an act of  which he is physically capable’.49 The MPC, although not specifically defining the
term ‘voluntary’, provides instead four exemplars of  acts that are not ‘voluntary’: (i) ‘a reflex
or convulsion’; (2) ‘a bodily movement during unconsciousness or sleep’; (3) ‘conduct
during hypnosis or resulting from hypnotic suggestion’; and (iv) ‘a bodily movement that is
otherwise not a product of  the effort or determination of  the actor either conscious or
habitual’.50 The illustrations are detailed in the Commentaries as conduct that is not within
the control of  the actor,51 but otherwise the template declines to offer a canonical
formulation of  the ‘act’ requirement, nor perform the determinative alchemy needed in
terms of  specificity for automatism vis á vis mens rea or actus reus elements of  a crime.52
In exceptional circumstances, the automatism rules may have an alternative role within
the law beyond a simple denial of  offence elements; although, again, this is not as a defence.
Rather, much like the intoxication rules, the automatism rules may function as the opposite
of  a defence, as a method of  inculpation.53 This arises where D’s automatic state results from
her own prior fault. In such cases, even though D does not satisfy the elements of  the
offence at the time it is committed (at T2), her earlier fault (at T1) substitutes for the missing
elements at T2 to complete the offence as a form of  constructive liability.54 In the case of
Marison,55 for example, D was convicted of  causing death by dangerous driving despite the
fact that at the point of  collision he was unconscious as a result of  a hypoglycaemic episode.
D had suffered such episodes before and so his prior fault in still deciding to drive (at T1)
substituted for his lack of  voluntariness when completing the other offence elements (at T2):
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47 Gardner (n 35) 149.
48 See, generally, Deborah W Denno, ‘A Mind to Blame: New Views on Involuntary Acts’ (2003) 21 Behavioral
Sciences and the Law 601; Kevin W Saunders, ‘Voluntary Acts and the Criminal Law: Justifying Culpability
Based on the Existence of  Volition’ (1998) 49 University of  Pittsburgh Law Review 443; and Grant (n 46).
49 MPC, s 2.01(1). The philosophical theory behind the rule is explained further in the Commentaries in terms
of  free will and volition: ‘That penal sanctions cannot be employed with justice unless these requirements are
satisfied seems wholly clear. It is fundamental that a civilized society does not punish for thoughts alone.
Beyond this, the law cannot hope to deter involuntary movement or to stimulate action that cannot physically
be performed; the sense of  personal security would be undermined in a society where such movement or
inactivity could lead to formal social condemnation of  the sort that a conviction necessarily entails. People
whose involuntary movements threaten harm to others may present a public health or safety problem, calling
for therapy or even custodial commitment; they do not present a problem of  correction.’; see MPC and
Commentaries, s. 2.01 cmt, at 214–15 (1985).
50 MPC and Commentaries s 2.01 (1985) 215; and see, generally, Grant (n 46).
51 MPC and Commentaries s 2.01 (1985) 215.
52 See, generally, Douglas Husak, ‘Rethinking the Act Requirement’ (2007) 28 Cardozo Law Journal 2437; and
see Joshua Dressler, Understanding Criminal Law 4th edn (Lexis Nexis 2006) 101, formulating the act
requirement in the following terms: ‘A person is not guilty of  an offense unless her conduct, which must
include a voluntary act, and which must be accompanied by a culpable state of  mind (the mens rea of  the
offense) is the actual and proximate cause of  the social harm, as proscribed by the offense.’
53 Ronnie Mackay, ‘Intoxication as a Factor in Automatism’ [1982] Criminal Law Review 146, 146–48.
54 This should be distinguished from so-called grand-schemer cases, where D loses voluntary control in order to
commit the offence. In such cases, it is contended, liability can be found simply through the appropriate use
of  the rules of  causation: see Child (n 2).
55 [1997] RTR 457.
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It was argued before this court . . . that [D] was driving as an automaton and
therefore cannot be guilty of  the offence. In our judgment, automatism does not
come into this case at all . . . Even if  the appellant was in an automatic state for
the last few seconds, he had already committed the offence by driving to that
point, in circumstances which he knew were such that he might have a
hypoglycaemic attack at any moment.56
In line with the judicial comments quoted in the first part of  this article, the court in Marison
presents the facts (D’s prior fault) as blocking the defence of  automatism: D cannot make
use of  the defence because he was at fault for creating the conditions that led to it.57 As
previously stated, this is to present the law in reverse. The correct analysis is that D did not
complete the elements of  the offence at T2 when death was caused; D was not acting
voluntarily and so an essential element of  his offence was missing. D’s prior fault (choosing
to drive and knowing of  the possibility of  losing consciousness in this manner) was used to
substitute for that missing element in order for the offence to be completed. Referring to
the ‘defence of  automatism’, the court was right to say that it was irrelevant to this case.
The rules of  automatism as a constructer of  liability, however, through the rules governing
prior fault, played a crucial role.
The automatism rules, then, can operate in two ways. First, automatism can be a simple
explanation (a shorthand) for D who does not commit an offence because her conduct is
not voluntary. Secondly, where D lacks voluntary conduct as a result of  prior fault, the
automatism rules can be used to substitute for that lack of  voluntariness to find liability.
Automatism is never, even exceptionally, a defence.
Problems with the automatism rules
Having set out our central contention, that the automatism rules are inculpatory as opposed
to exculpatory in function, it is useful to question what effect this might have on the
application of  those rules. To do so, we will explore two areas of  debate that have been
central to the automatism rules for some time, and then two further areas of  debate that
arise as a result of  our analysis in this article. In this manner, we hope to demonstrate how
the classification of  automatism as a constructer of  liability has important implications for
the substance of  those rules.
The first longstanding area of  debate, relevant to all cases of  potential involuntariness,
concerns the threshold of  capacity required for D’s acts or omissions to be considered
voluntary.58 Discussed in the context of  a ‘defence’ of  automatism, the question is whether
automatism requires D to lack all physical control of  her conduct (for example, through
unconsciousness or physical spasm), or whether it is sufficient that she lacks effective or
rational control (for example, through dissociation short of  full unconsciousness).59 The
debate has been a problematic one: lacking a medical consensus for the law to take reference
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56 Marison [1997] RTR 457, 461 (McCowan LJ).
57 See John Rumbold and Martin Wasik, ‘Diabetic Drivers, Hypoglycaemic Unawareness and Automatism’ [2011]
Criminal Law Review 863, 866: ‘Usually the diabetic driver has been at fault in the management of  their
condition, and so any defence of  automatism fails . . . [T]he condition of  hypoglycaemic unawareness is highly
relevant to this issue of  fault, and is a factor to which lawyers involved in such cases should be alert.’
58 See A P Simester, J R Spencer, G R Sullivan and G J Virgo, Criminal Law: Theory and Doctrine 5th edn (Hart
2013) 112, delineating road traffic cases from others: ‘It is noteworthy that the cases in which the most
stringent demands are made all concern driving offences.’; and see further on the effective control
requirement, Douglas Husak, ‘The Alleged Act Requirement in Criminal Law’ in The Oxford Handbook of
Philosophy of  Criminal Law (Oxford University Press 2011) 107.
59 A useful overview is provided in Law Commission (n 3) para. 5.22–32.
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from60 and prone to policy-based inconsistencies.61 However, what is most interesting for
present purposes, has been the presentation of  this uncertainty within the courts;
particularly in the last few years where they have shown a consistent preference for the
narrower interpretation of  automatism. For example, in the case of  C,62 Lord Justice
Hughes comments:
Automatism, if  it occurs, results in a complete acquittal on the grounds that the
act was not that of  the defendant at all . . . ‘Involuntary’ is not the same as ‘irrational’;
indeed it needs sharply to be distinguished from it.63
In contrast, commentators who favour a wider view of  automatism have tended to focus
on the related issue of  moral responsibility. For example, Horder contends:
The all-embracing explanatory claims of  the voluntary conduct model . . . [is]
where one finds an assumption about non-insane automatism that all that
matters is physical capacity to engage in voluntary conduct, and that the question
of  whether one has control over conduct is the same thing as whether one is
engaging in voluntary conduct at all.64
Whether we classify automatism as a defence does not determine the outcome of  this
debate, but it can play an important role. This is because, if  automatism is (accurately)
presented as a simple shorthand for an incomplete offence, then we are forced to consider
what is required in order to form a complete offence. This focuses on questions of
sufficient moral responsibility and the required nexus of  agency between D’s conduct and
surrounding offence elements: exactly the focus that leads Horder and others to advocate a
narrower view of  voluntariness (i.e. a broader ‘defence’ of  automatism). In contrast, the
dominant view of  automatism as a defence encourages the courts to begin from the
opposing premise; asking whether D’s lack of  control was sufficient to excuse her from
liability for an existing criminal wrong. This approach encourages the courts, as we have
seen, to think in terms of  maintaining sensible limits on a defence that can lead to a complete
acquittal: a focus that inevitably leads one to a narrower conception of  the ‘defence’ (i.e. a
broader notion of  voluntariness).65 Demonstrating that automatism is never a defence, we
hope that this debate can be set on the appropriate foundations: questioning whether
impaired or dissociative mental control should be considered sufficient to construct and tie
together criminal wrongs.
The second longstanding debate affected by our classification discussion relates
specifically to prior fault66 and the inculpatory role of  the automatism rules: questioning
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whether the notion of  prior fault requires subjective or objective foresight, and foresight of
what? Case law engaging these questions has moved inconsistently between various options,
with cases such as Quick67 suggesting that the automatism ‘defence’ would be defeated
where D ‘could have reasonably foreseen [the criminal harms] as a result of  either doing, or
omitting to do, something’,68 whereas others, such as Bailey,69 have suggested that it would
only be defeated where D subjectively foresaw the possibility of  future harms.70 As above,
we do not believe that the classification of  automatism as a defence is determinative of  this
debate, but again, it must have a role. This is because, if  our argument is accepted that the
automatism rules (as they relate to prior fault) are inculpatory in function, that they are
replacing missing elements of  an offence, then the debate must hinge on what construction
of  prior fault is required for culpability equivalence with the offence elements they are
seeking to replace (the lack of  voluntariness at T2). With this in mind, it becomes very
difficult to maintain that negligently71 failing to foresee the potential for future
dangerousness or simple future involuntariness (i.e. objective prior fault at T1) is equivalent
to voluntary movement and awareness of  circumstances at T2. In fact, it is even difficult to
accept an equivalence between voluntariness and awareness at T2 with some manner of
subjective foresight of  involuntariness or a possible future risk (i.e. subjective foresight at
T1), but this will be discussed further below. Again, we have a longstanding debate of  vital
importance, but one that is currently being conducted on faulty terms.
The debate has been enervated in recent times by a number of  US and Canadian
commentators, who have suggested that a recategorisation of  actio libera in causa principles
should broadly apply to formulate an appropriate prior fault and intoxication doctrine.72 By
parity of  reason, a similar reformulation is propounded within the purview of  automatism.
The actio libera doctrine, as previously constructed, operates to disallow D relying on
exculpation (defence) at T2, the conditions for which she has culpably created at T1.73 As
stated, when properly deconstructed, a reverse nexus may apply, not in terms of  defence
nomenclature, but rather as a predicate of  liability for the morally culpable automatistic
individual. Dimock categorises the principle, however, in another distinctive hue, as a
derivative of  ‘imputation’ not of  inculpation: ‘[I]f  . . . we think such conduct can, despite
being voluntary, reveal the relevant attitudes of  the agent, it seems we must be looking to
the prior conduct of  the agent in creating the conditions of  involuntariness to make the
connection.’74 The practical reality, viewed either through a kaleidoscope of  imputation or
inculpation, is that the criminal responsibility and fault of  the actor at T1 must be traced
through in a causal sense to harm commission at T2: a requirement Robinson has stated of
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‘a strong causal connection with the imputed objective element, culpability as to the causal
connection itself, and the culpability required by the substantive offence’.75
In constitutive effect, prior fault automatistic ‘conduct’ engages a conflagration of
criminal responsibility, blameworthiness and tracing principles, aligned together to focus
potentiate culpability at the temporal individuation point where D may questionably have
had ‘guidance-control’ over voluntary action, as Fischer and Ravizza have cogently
articulated:
When one acts from reasons—responsiveness mechanism at T1, and one can
reasonably be expected to know that so acting will (or may) lead to acting from
an unresponsive mechanism at some later time T2, one can be held responsible
for so acting at T2.76
The responsibility-tracing-fault nexus, as propounded for prior fault automatistic
individuation, was vividly exemplified in a straightforward categorisation by the High Court
of  Australia in Ryan v R.77 D, in the course of  a robbery, had threatened a service station
cashier with a sawn-off  rifle; the rifle was loaded and the safety-catch had been deliberately
removed at T1 time-frame. Ryan attempted to tie up the cashier with one hand while pointing
the rifle at him with the other. Unfortunately, the cashier made a sudden movement and D
shot him dead. D asserted that, ‘startled’ by V at whom his gun was pointed, his finger
depressed the trigger as a truly involuntary ‘reflex action’. The majority in the High Court of
Australia, in contradistinction, adopted the perspective that Ryan had voluntarily (culpably at
T1) placed himself  in a situation where he might need to make a split-second decision and
the fact that he so responded by pulling the trigger did not make that act an involuntary act
in the nature of  an act done in a convulsion or epileptic seizure. Chief  Justice Barwick, in the
minority, but legitimately on the facts, determined that D’s account of  the events engaged in
pulling the trigger, if  true, did embody a reflex action in the sense of  being unwilled: Ryan’s
squeezing of  the trigger was more akin to an act done in a convulsion or epileptic seizure
than it is to that of  a tennis player retrieving a difficult shot where the action is a willed
muscular movement albeit that the decision to make it is made in a split second.78 Literal
involuntariness may standardise Ryan’s pressing of  the trigger, but prior fault applied in
releasing the safety-catch of  the weapon and, similarly in Commonwealth v Fain,79 where D, a
sleep-pattern disordered individual (that made him violent when aroused from sleep) was
criminally responsible at T1 for going to sleep in a public room of  a hotel with a deadly
weapon on his person. Inculpation is derived from prior fault at T1 temporal individuation
for which the individual is criminally responsible and not automatistic ‘involuntariness’ at T2.
Pithy realism should apply to our consideration of  prior fault and the actio libera doctrine
attached to automatism as well as intoxication, arguably standardising the criminalisation of
behaviour in this sphere derivatively from harmful moral agency.80
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Automatism and intoxication: the construction of liability
The next two areas of  debate, although not entirely foreign to the discussion of
automatism, are more commonly associated with the intoxication rules. However, once it is
accepted that, like the intoxication rules, automatism is never a defence (and may act as a
constructer of  liability), then they become central to this area as well. These debates both
relate to the role of  prior fault and the construction of  liability, first, to the specific/basic
intent distinction and, secondly, to the appropriate labelling of  offenders.
The distinction between basic and specific intent offences is crucial to the operation of
the intoxication rules. The distinction relates to the mens rea required as to any circumstance
or result elements within the offence charged. As well as substituting for a lack of  voluntary
conduct at T2,81 D’s intoxication will substitute for a lack of  mens rea as to these elements
where the offence is one of  basic intent (constructing liability), but not for offences of
specific intent (failing to construct liability).82 For example, if  D attacks V causing grievous
bodily harm (GBH), but lacks all mens rea and even acts involuntarily as a result of  voluntary
intoxication, she cannot be liable for an offence of  causing GBH with intent83 (specific
intent offence), but will be liable for a recklessness-based GBH offence (basic intent
offence).84 Following our interpretation of  prior fault automatism in line with the
intoxication rules, the question now is whether the same distinction applies to automatism?
It is clear that prior fault automatism is capable of  substituting for more than solely a lack
of  voluntariness because otherwise it could only operate to construct liability for strict
liability offences: where D lacks control of  her body, she is very unlikely to be acting with
any subjective mens rea as to associated circumstances or results.85 But in what manner (if  at
all) is the potential for constructing liability in this context restricted?
The early case law on prior fault and automatism did not recognise a basic/specific
intent distinction; implying a very broad potential for the substitution of  missing mens rea
elements. In Quick,86 for example, Lawton LJ states:
A self-induced incapacity will not excuse . . . nor will one which could have been
reasonably foreseen as a result of  either doing, or omitting to do something, as,
for example, taking alcohol against medical advice after using certain prescribed
drugs, or failing to have regular meals while taking insulin.87
Although the offence in Quick was one of  basic intent, the broad language of  this statement
(potentially embracing both basic and specific intent offences) led Mackay to highlight the
potential for an indefensible inconsistency between the intoxication rules and automatism.
. . . a defendant like Quick, had he been prosecuted for a crime of  ‘specific intent,’
would have been convicted of  that offence had he been found not to have
followed his doctor’s instructions, whereas his intoxicated counterpart would
only have been convicted of  a crime of  ‘basic intent.’88
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The potential for this inconsistency, and the role for a basic/specific intent distinction in
automatism cases, finally arose in the case of  Bailey:89 a case involving the specific intent
offence of  wounding or causing GBH with intent. However, this case does more to confuse
the law than to clarify it. The court highlighted (in line with Mackay) that Quick should not
be interpreted to allow non-intoxicated prior fault automatism to substitute for missing mens
rea elements in crimes of  specific intent.90 The court then goes further to cast doubt on its
ability to substitute for similar elements in crimes of  basic intent as well:
In our judgment, self-induced automatism, other than that due to intoxication
from alcohol or drugs, may provide a defence to crimes of  basic intent. The
question in each case will be whether the prosecution have proved the necessary
element of  recklessness. In cases of  assault, if  the accused knows that his actions
or inaction are likely to make him aggressive, unpredictable or uncontrolled with
the result that he may cause some injury to others and he persists in the action
or takes no remedial action when he knows it is required, it will be open to the
jury to find that he was reckless.91
In this statement, Griffiths LJ is essentially undermining any role that prior fault could play
in the construction of  liability, regardless of  the offence charged. This is because he would
restrict the automatism prior fault rules to cases where D foresees not only that her conduct
might lead to involuntariness, but also that that involuntariness might lead to relevant harms
or be performed in relevant circumstances. As discussed elsewhere, these cases do not
require a substitution of  missing mens rea elements and are better dealt with through the
rules of  causation.92 Where a substitution is required to construct liability, where D foresees
possible involuntariness (is at fault) but does not foresee risks of  harm, the court in Bailey
would not find liability.
We are left with two areas of  confusion. First, does the basic/specific intent distinction
have a role in automatism cases? And, secondly, if  prior fault automatism can construct
liability for at least basic intent offences, what must D foresee at T1 to be considered at
fault? These questions have been touched upon in a recent flurry of  automatism cases in
the Court of  Appeal,93 but received very little specific consideration. Importantly, however,
the Law Commission (in its recent discussion paper)94 has provided some analysis on these
questions and has attempted to draw principles from the case law: principles that may well
encourage greater consistency in future cases. For the Commission, despite its reservations
as to the specific/basic intent distinction, there is a useful recognition that prior fault for
automatism should be consistent with prior fault for intoxication. Thus, contrary to Bailey,
prior fault automatism should be able to replace a lack of  mens rea for basic intent offences,
even where D merely foresees (at T1) a potential loss of  voluntariness as opposed to future
results or circumstances.95 The Commission also concludes, with reference to our
discussion above, that subjective (as opposed to objective) foresight should be required as
to that loss of  voluntariness.96 Such conclusions are useful from the point of  view of
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certainty, however, whether they are correctly made is likely to have been influenced by their
categorisation of  automatism as a defence (as discussed above).
The Law Commission has suggested a limited classificatory exception, to cover the
scenario where a defendant becomes intoxicated through taking drugs in accordance with a
medical prescription, or reasonably in the circumstances and, through no fault of  his own,
suffers a reaction which causes a loss of  capacity.97 The individual in this scenario, contrary
to earlier perspectives, would not fit within involuntary intoxication provisions, but rather
the newly articulated RMC defence.98 This formulation is cognisant, to a degree, of  the
American Law Institute acceptance of  pathological intoxication providing an affirmative
defence:99 pathological intoxication defined as the rapid onset of  acute intoxication
following consumption of  intoxicants, which is insufficient to cause intoxication in most
people.100 The condition is standardised as ‘involuntary’ as the actor was unaware that the
substance would intoxicate her to the extent it did, and, moreover, is distinguished from
self-induced incapacity as contextually it takes the individual ‘by surprise’:101
[A] provision was required because of  a concern that bizarre behaviour caused
in part by an abnormal bodily condition (in some cases, in others the atypical
intoxication can be related to mental disturbance) . . . would not seem to fall
under s. 4.01 [the insanity defence].102
The final area of  debate is one that has emerged in recent years as the defining issue for the
intoxication rules, but is rarely discussed in the context of  automatism. It asks, if  D’s prior
fault results in liability for a basic intent offence, is D fairly labelled and criminalised for that
offence? To answer this question, we must weigh the blameworthiness of  D’s prior fault (at
T1) against the blameworthiness of  the missing offence elements (at T2), looking for
equivalence in order to justify the potential for substitution. In the context of  the
intoxication rules, the traditional interpretation of  intoxication as a defence had supplied a
useful mechanism for attempts to avoid the burden of  establishing this equivalence: as a
defence, you simply need to consider what should be required to excuse a (fictionally
completed) criminal wrong. However, as more commentators have accepted (in line with
Simester) that intoxication is never a defence, it is clear that such equivalence must be
demonstrated to justify liability. That is, equivalence between voluntary intoxication at T1
and the missing basic intent elements such as recklessness as to specific circumstances
and/or results at T2 (and, potentially, missing voluntary conduct).
Still focusing on the equivalence thesis in the context of  intoxication, there have been
several attempts to demonstrate such equivalence that are useful to our discussion of
automatism. In each case, the argument is made that the effects of  alcohol or other
dangerous drugs are sufficiently well know within the population, that when becoming
intoxicated at T1, we can assume that D (at least subconsciously) was aware of  creating a
danger at T2. As Horder states:
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. . . my blundering into harm can hardly be said to be spontaneous or unexpected
if  I have knowingly done that which is—as is taken to be common knowledge—
liable to make me blunder.103
Such logic is often repeated in the courts, for example:
. . . there is nothing unreasonable or illogical in the law holding that a mind
rendered self-inducedly insensible . . . through drink or drugs, to the nature of  a
prohibited act or to its probable consequences is as wrongful a mind as one
which consciously contemplates the prohibited act and foresees its probable
consequences (or is reckless as to whether they ensue).104
And, recently, by the Law Commission:
Given the culpability associated with knowingly and voluntarily becoming
intoxicated, and the associated increase in the known risk of  aggressive
behaviour, there is a compelling argument for imposing criminal liability to the
extent reflected by that culpability.105
The problem with this logic, as highlighted by Simester and others, is that demonstrating
some general fault in becoming intoxicated (at T1) is not the same as a specific foresight of
a specific risk at the point that the actus reus of  the offence is committed (at T2).106 Thus,
the question of  equivalence between the two types of  fault remains open.
If  we are correct that the structure of  prior fault automatism mirrors that of
intoxication as a potentially inculpatory tool, then we would expect a similar debate to arise
here as well. This has not been the case. It is our contention that this debate is missing from
automatism chiefly because of  the three areas of  uncertainty discussed above. How can we
measure the equivalent blameworthiness of  D’s prior fault automatism if  we do not know
the required degree of  D’s involuntariness, whether that prior fault is subjective or objective,
and what exactly D must foresee? And what can this fault be balanced against if  we do not
know whether the prior fault rules apply to basic and/or specific intent offences? However,
our criticism here is not only that legal uncertainties have beguiled the debate, but that, as
soon as these uncertainties are resolved, the incoherence of  the automatism rules within the
current law becomes fully apparent.
The Law Commission’s search for consistent interpretations of  the current law
(introduced above) allow us to set out a similar equivalence debate for prior fault
automatism as exists for the intoxication rules. Thus, for the Commission, consistently with
intoxication, prior fault automatism will apply (constructing liability) where D subjectively
foresees the possibility of  becoming automatic at T1, and this is equivalent to missing basic
intent mens rea (recklessness, negligence etc) and voluntariness at T2. Although this logic is
essential to the justifiable operation of  the current law, it is an equivalence that few
commentators would be willing to accept. Indeed, even those advocating equivalence
between missing basic intent mens rea and intoxication are likely to have a problem here. The
court in Bailey, for example, has stated that:
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. . . it seems to us that there may be material distinctions between a man who
consumes alcohol or takes dangerous drugs [prior fault intoxication] and one
who fails to take sufficient food after insulin to avert hypoglycaemia [prior fault
automatism]. It is common knowledge that those who take alcohol to excess or
certain sorts of  drugs may become aggressive or do dangerous or unpredictable
things, they may be able to foresee the risks of  causing harm to others but
nevertheless persist in their conduct. But the same cannot be said without more
of  a man who fails to take food after an insulin injection.107
Even if  one is persuaded by the (we believe, unconvincing) case for equivalence between
intoxication and basic intent mens rea, such equivalence is even more difficult to demonstrate
in the context of  prior fault automatism. It is clear that the current law relating to prior fault
automatism must be relying on such equivalence in order to justify the use of  prior fault to
replace missing offence elements and construct liability. Therefore, if  no such equivalence
is present, any defendant convicted and labelled as an offender under this doctrine has been
unfairly treated.
Looking forward
As with the inculpatory rules on intoxication, there are three main options for automatism
moving forward: attempting to justify something similar to the status quo; abolishing the
prior fault rules and acquitting D whenever there is evidence of  involuntariness; or creating
a bespoke prior fault-based offence. As with intoxication, it is the last of  these options that
seems most attractive.
The first option, then, is to seek equivalence between prior fault automatism (at T1) and
missing basic intent mens rea and voluntariness (at T2). This route, of  course, has been the
one employed by the Law Commission for the intoxication rules.108 It is contended that this
option (and thus any thought of  maintaining the current law) lacks viability. Even within the
courts and those advocating the equivalence thesis in the context of  intoxication, there is
very little support for its automatism equivalent: there is simply no public consensus (as is
claimed for intoxication) that foresight of  involuntariness equates to a general foresight of
danger to others or property. The law could require more of  D at T1 to create something
closer to comparable fault, and this was what we meant above when we suggested that old
debates relating to degrees of  involuntariness and subjective versus objective foresight were
recast by the recognition of  prior fault automatism as an inculpatory tool. Without
additional foresight of  future circumstances or results at T1, as per Bailey, any prospect of
equivalence seems unlikely. But following Bailey is also unattractive: where D satisfies the
mens rea of  the offence at T1 (is reckless as to future results, for example) then there is no
need for rules of  prior fault, it is enough to apply the general rules of  causation. We could
require some non-specific foresight of  danger (as well as involuntariness) at T1 as a middle
ground between Bailey and mere foresight of  involuntariness. Even with this additional fault
at T1, it would be difficult to demonstrate equivalence with missing mens rea as to specific
offence elements and as to voluntariness at T2. In short, the current law, and even
adjustments based on the current structure of  the law, appear undesirable.
The second option moving forward concedes that the current law is operating on the
basis of  an unjustifiable equivalence, and in the absence of  such equivalence no liability (at
all) should be found. This option is exemplified in the quotation from Bailey above,
maintaining that D should only be liable where she acts at T1 with (essentially) the full mens
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rea required for the principal offence. As stated, liability here does not require constructed
liability through prior fault, but simply the standard rules of  causation: D’s acts at T1
become the conduct element of  the actus reus (coinciding with her mens rea), and the question
is then whether these acts caused the result at T2. Where D lacks mens rea at T1, even where
she foresees future involuntariness (exhibits some prior fault), the court in Bailey and this
option moving forward would find no liability. In this manner, missing basic intent offence
elements could never be substituted for by evidence of  non-intoxicated prior fault
automatism. In our view, unlike the first option, this option has an obvious attraction.
The final option will be sketched here, but will require considerably more work before
it becomes truly viable: a new prior fault automatism offence. In line with option two, the
first premise of  this approach is that prior fault automatism is not equivalent to missing
offence elements and should never be able to reconstruct or substitute for such elements.
Moving beyond the second option, a new offence would recognise that certain cases of
prior fault automatism that lead to harms are deserving of  criminalisation: not through a
fiction that D has completed offence elements that are missing (as with the current law and
option one), but by creating an offence that accurately labels and punishes that which D has
done. This approach has been advocated in the context of  intoxication for many years,
seeking to criminalise and label D in line with her actual conduct: voluntarily becoming
intoxicated and causing harm.109
In this regard, Williams110 has recently advocated the creation of  a new alternative
intoxication offence, facilitating inculpation where a defendant ‘commits [the actus reus of
offence X] while intoxicated’.111 The essence of  this suggestion is that the combined
simulacrum of  intoxication and harm, despite absence of  mens rea, is inculpatory in
circumstances where the harm per se would not be criminalised without mens rea or
intoxication. The bespoke offence template has also been identified by Loughnan112 as the
way forward for intoxication prior fault doctrine, arguing that this approach would ‘make
overt the connection between intoxication and criminal liability, sabotaging the myth that
intoxication is some kind of  “defence” to a criminal charge’.113 This mirrors the
standardisation adopted in German criminal law, identifying a specific offence to detail the
inculpatory nature of  prevening fault for intoxication:
Whosoever intentionally or negligently puts himself  into a drunken state by
consuming alcoholic beverages or other intoxicants shall be liable to imprisonment
of  not more than five years or a fine if  he commits an unlawful act while in this
state . . . The penalty must not be more severe than the penalty provided for the
offence which was committed while he was in the drunken state.114
When considering a new offence of  prior fault automatism causing harm, one of  the main
advantages is that we can explicitly and accurately consider what is required for
criminalisation in a manner that is hopelessly confused within the current law. Returning to
Automatism is never a defence
109 See Smith and Williams in the Criminal Law Revision Committee (n 2); and see Child (n 2).
110 Williams (n 2) 277.
111 Ibid 277.
112 Arlie Loughnan, Manifest Madness: Mental Incapacity in the Criminal Law (Oxford University Press 2012) 314–16.
113 Ibid 315; and see further, Arlie Loughnan, ‘Mental Incapacity Doctrines in Criminal Law’ (2012) 15 New
Criminal Law Review 1; Douglas Husak, ‘Intoxication and Culpability’ (2012) 6 Criminal Law and Philosophy
363; Susan Dimock, ‘What are Intoxicated Offenders Responsible for? The “Intoxication Defense” Re-
examined’ (2011) 5 Criminal Law and Philosophy 1; and Gideon Yaffe, ‘Intoxication, Recklessness and
Negligence’ (2012) 9 Ohio State Journal of  Criminal Law 545.
114 Die Übersetzung [German Criminal Code], 13 November 1998, BGB1 [Federal Law Gazette] s 323a,
amended by Article 3 of  the Law of  2 October 2009.
183
first principles, our task is to identify a public wrong (if  there is one) deserving of
criminalisation. The first question will be to consider and define the fault required of  D at
T1. Assuming that a new offence of  this kind is not simply criminalising those who are
likely to lose control and be a danger,115 but rather those who are at fault in some way for
their future involuntariness, it is likely that we would require some subjective foresight of
future involuntariness and also foresight of  a non-specific danger to others associated with
that involuntariness. The preference for subjective foresight, and foresight of  danger as well as
simple involuntariness, is designed to target only those who lose control at T1 with a similar
level of  blameworthiness as the voluntarily intoxicated (where such foresight is, perhaps,
more easily assumed). Although often neglected in debates on a possible intoxication
offence, we would also need to consider what types of  harms would be required at T2.116
For example, although we may conclude that a criminal wrong is completed where D’s prior
fault automatism results in bodily harm to a victim or property damage (harms that may be
linked to D’s general foresight at T1 of  future danger to people and property), it may be
inappropriate to criminalise D where the same prior fault leads to an unpredicted harm (for
example, to property rights). Indeed, even within the categories of  bodily or property harm,
we may conclude that D’s wrong is only deserving of  criminalisation where that harm is of
a particularly serious degree.
Having established a potential offence of  prior fault automatism to work alongside
existing offences, it is then appropriate to discuss the degree of  involuntariness required for
D to be classed as automatic. The extremes are clear: complete voluntariness would be dealt
with under existing offences, and total involuntariness (i.e. unconsciousness) would be
considered under the new offence. The space between these extremes gives rise to an
interesting debate. In view of  our previous discussions above, we would broadly support
the idea that D is not sufficiently competent to create the nexus of  agency required for
existing offences unless she acts with a high level of  voluntariness. Therefore, if  we cannot
ascribe those later harms to D through traditional means, it only seems appropriate to blame
D for those harms where she acted with prior fault. Our view is that the potential new
offence should therefore operate across a considerably wider class of  cases than the
‘automatism defence’ does under the current law. Under the current law, where D causes
harm in a partially involuntary (or dissociative) state, she is likely to be convicted for existing
offences: failing to meet the high threshold of  the automatism ‘defence’. Under the
approach mooted, in contrast, D would either be liable for the new offence in circumstances
of  prior fault (accurately labelling what D has done), or D would be acquitted.
A presented danger, of  course, in creating a new prior fault automatism offence, as with
intoxication, is that it creates the potentiality of  split juries across the bifurcatory offence
particularisations.117 It is submitted, however, that this concern may be more apparent than
real, as fact-finders have been commendably robust in ascription of  liability for
murder/manslaughter and respective gradations, contextualising gross negligence
manslaughter, and substitute alternative verdicts for s 18, s 20 or s 47 Offences Against the
Person Act 1861 thresholds of  harm. Moreover, as Williams asserts in the province of  a
prior fault intoxication offence, difficulties may be abrogated by utilisation of  majority
verdict precepts118 and the Law Commission, although reticent over creation of  prior fault
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inculpatory offences, nonetheless acknowledges that jurors may be ‘as capable of  handling
the decision between the two offences [in this context] as they are of  handling the many
other cases where, at present, a defendant may be convicted of  alternative offences’.119
A final point that should be considered as to the potential new offence relates to its
consistency with intoxication where D lacks mens rea as a result of  her prior fault, but is not
automatic. It is an interesting point of  comparison that, where D lacks mens rea as a result
of  prior fault but still acts voluntarily, if  D is intoxicated, we may find liability, but if  D is
not intoxicated, we would not: even under the prior fault automatism offence discussed
here, a lack of  voluntariness at T2 is an essential part of  the offence. For example, D1 and
D2 both knock over V causing bodily harm, both are acting voluntarily but did not notice
V in their way. D1 does not notice V because she is voluntarily intoxicated and will therefore
be liable for an offence under the current law (constructing liability), or for a proposed
intoxication offence. D2 does not notice V because she is in a daze having negligently not
eaten after taking insulin for her diabetes and will therefore not be liable for any offence as
she lacks mens rea. Some of  this inconsistency may be corrected by our wider view of
involuntariness within the new offence (leading to liability in cases that would not have done
within the current law), but there will still be cases that do not fall within even our inflated
definition of  involuntariness. It may be that these cases do not warrant criminalisation and
the inconsistency with intoxication is simply a reflection of  the different wrongs involved
in each route to liability. We are generally minded towards this conclusion. However, the
debate is important and emerges most clearly with the recognition that both intoxication
and automatism are playing inculpatory roles.
Conclusion
The central aim of  this article has been to set out and justify the contention that automatism
is never a defence. Where D is not at fault for her lack of  voluntariness, the term
‘automatism’ is simply a shorthand explanation that D does not satisfy an essential element
of  every offence: voluntary conduct. Where D is at fault for her lack of  voluntariness, the
automatism rules (within the current law) become an inculpatory tool through which to
substitute for missing offence elements and construct liability.
Having recognised that automatism plays an inculpatory role within the law, we have
then analysed this role and concluded that it is defective: prior fault automatism lacks the
equivalent blameworthiness necessary to fairly substitute for even missing basic intent
offence elements. It is from here that we have discussed the possibility of  a new automatism
offence, to recognise the criminal blameworthiness of  D’s conduct in certain cases, but to
do so in a coherent manner that appropriately criminalises and labels the defendant.
Looking at the outline of  the potential new offence, we are in a much better position to
evaluate the future role of  automatism in the criminal law. If  we do not believe that such an
offence is deserving of  criminalisation, then the current law must be changed to prevent
prior fault automatism constructing liability under any circumstances. If  we do believe that
such an offence has a place within the criminal law, then the current law should be changed
to reflect this more clearly, and we must focus on exactly how it should be defined.
The obvious next step will involve a similar examination of  insanity. In line with
intoxication and automatism, prior fault insanity (recognised by the Law Commission)120
may also have a role in the construction of  offences, but the case law here is
Automatism is never a defence
119 Law Commission, Intoxication and Criminal Liability (Law Com No 127 1993) para 6.27.
120 Law Commission (n 3) para 5.36–76 and 6.30–31.
185
undeveloped.121 If  D negligently or recklessly fails to take medication resulting in
involuntariness or dissociation and ultimately harm to the person or property, it would seem
strange if  they avoided liability where an intoxicated D, or D who actively medicated
improperly, would not. Indeed, it may be that such liability is best served through a new or
combined offence alongside voluntary intoxication and prior fault automatism causing
harm. However, insanity will be a more difficult case. After all, unlike automatism and
intoxication, where D satisfies both the actus reus and mens rea of  an offence, insanity may
still be a relevant consideration: it is, sometimes, a defence.
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